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THE INTERACTION OF ERISA
AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT*
EvAN J. SPELFOGEL**
INTRODUCTION
Health care may be the single largest issue facing the United
States today. The number of uninsured or inadequately insured
Americans now total over eighty million,1 including retired per-
sons, the unemployed, the homeless, and employees whose em-
ployers do not provide health care or insurance coverage.2 For big
business, the situation has become increasingly urgent.3 Corpo-
rate America is struggling under the weight of burgeoning medi-
cal costs which now constitute nearly thirteen percent of our coun-
try's gross national product.4 Over the past several years,
Congress has considered more than thirty health care reform pro-
* © Copyright 1993 Evan J. Spelfogel. Portions of this Article appeared in the
July 1994 issue of The Disability Law Reporter Service (Vol. 3 No. 7) and are
published here with the permission of Prentice-Hall Law and Business.
** Evan J. Spelfogel, a member of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., is a co-founder
and past Chair of the New York State Bar Association's Labor and Employment Law
Section, and a member of its Executive Committee. He is also a past and honorary
life Member of the governing Council of the American Bar Association's Labor and
Employment Law Section, and has served as a Delegate to the House of Delegates of
both Bar Associations. He is a member of the Board of Senior Editors of The Treatise,
Employee Benefits Law (BNA 1991) and its Annual Supplements. Epstein Becker &
Green associate Kevin Ellwood, Catholic University School of Law, J.D. 1993, assisted
in the preparation of footnotes.
1 See James Sterngold, Japan's Health Care: Cradle, Graves and No Frills, N.Y.
TmEs, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al; Joy Korngut & Patricia Willen, Treasury Debunks Health
Care Myths, States News Service, July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File.
2 See generally Arnold Abrams, Health Care Popular, NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 1994, at
A20 (discussing success of health care facility for poor and homeless); Free Health
Care Clinics, STAR Trs., Aug. 15, 1994, at 7B (discussing clinics which provide health
care services for "uninsured employees and children, unemployed people whose bene-
fits have expired and people not yet receiving public assistance, as well as families
whose medical insurance doesn't cover ordinary needs").
3 See, e.g., Sterngold, supra note 1, at Al (indicating that American businesses
pay about five times more than Japanese companies for employee health insurance).
Sterngold notes that American companies pay approximately $3452 per employee per
year. Id.
4 Sterngold, supra note 1, at Al.
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posals in an effort to remedy this5 and related problems such as
duplicative health benefit coverage, wasteful administrative costs,
abuses of existing systems, and fraud.6 President Clinton has
submitted to Congress his proposal for reform, comprising over
250 pages of legislative text.7 The forthcoming debate is certain to
be prolonged, far-reaching and divisive.
Parallel to the move for health care reform has been the
spreading epidemic of the Human Immuno Virus and Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") and the devastating toll
they have taken upon both the lives and livelihoods of infected
persons and their families.8 AIDS kills, on average, approxi-
mately ninety-two Americans every day and is now the third lead-
ing cause of death among people between twenty-five and forty-
four years old.9 The cost of treatment for and maintenance of per-
sons afflicted with AIDS has far exceeded costs normally covered
and absorbed by employers and their health insurance carriers. 10
In many cases, carriers have refused to continue insurance, re-
duced lifetime benefits, or dramatically increased premiums to re-
flect cost increases and the unpredictable variables involved in
medical practice and technology."
5 See John Schwartz & Mary Hager, Start the Revolution With Me, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 14, 1992, at 58 (noting Congress "tossed in more than 30 [health care]
proposals").
6 See Robert Pear, Health-Care Plan May Cover Injuries on Job and Roads, N.Y.
TimEs, May 8, 1993, at 1 (noting goal of one particular proposal was to "reduce dupli-
cative insurance policies, reduce administrative paperwork and save money in the
health-care system overall") (quoting Robert 0. Boorstin, spokesperson for Task Force
on National Health Care Reform).
7 See Clinton Plan Does Not Address Fully Rural Health Issues, Pens. & Ben.
Daily (BNA) (Sept. 15, 1993).
8 See, e.g., Karen Shideler, AIDS Dips Into the Hearts of Families, Hous. CHRON.,
Dec. 1, 1993, at 3; Michele Lynche, Nowhere to Hide from AIDS, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at 3.
9 AIDS-Prevention Initiative Aimed at Young Adults Unveiled by Shalala, Health
Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at D10 (Jan. 10, 1994).
10 Fred J. Hellinger, The Lifetime Cost of Treating a Person With HIV, 270 JAMA
474 (1993) (noting that "[e]stimates of the lifetime cost.., of treating [individuals
with AIDS] have climbed steadily over the past several years and now exceed
$100,000.").
11 See, e.g., infra notes 13, 19, 21, 23, 35, and 38 (illustrating cases in which in-
surance carriers have reduced or attempted to reduce coverage to selected subscrib-
ers); see also Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)
(discussing 'unstable variables" which affect insurance and health care industries).
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I. ERISA-THE McGA DECISION
The conflict between employees diagnosed with AIDS and
their employers and insurance carriers came to a head three years
ago in the Fifth Circuit's decision in McGann v. H & H Music Co. 12
John McGann, an employee of H & H Music, discovered that he
was afflicted with AIDS in December 1987. Soon thereafter, he
submitted his first claims for reimbursement under the company's
group medical plan.'" At that time, the plan provided for lifetime
medical benefits of up to one million dollars.14 Upon learning of
McGann's illness and the attendant long-term costs of caring for
McGann, H & H Music, through its insurer, amended the plan to,
inter alia, limit benefits payable for AIDS-related claims to a life-
time maximum of $5000.11 The amendment did not place this lim-
itation on any other catastrophic illness.'
6
Upon exhausting the $5000 benefits limitation, McGann filed
suit under section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act ("ERISA7),' 7 claiming that his employer, the plan adminis-
trator, and the plan insurer had all discriminated against him by
reducing benefits for treatment of AIDS and AIDS-related ill-
nesses.' 8 The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that, in accord with ERISA, "the action was
not taken to interfere with the rights of McCann [sic] but to en-
sure the future existence of the plan."19 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that section 510 of ERISA does not prohibit
12 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
13 Id. at 403.
14 Id.
15 Id. Other changes included increased individual and family deductibles, elimi-
nation of coverage for chemical dependency treatment, adoption of a preferred pro-
vider plan, and increased contribution requirements. Id.
16 Id.
17 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988)). Section 510 makes
it illegal for any person:
to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a par-
ticipant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under
the provisions of an employee benefit plan or for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become enti-
tled under the plan ....
Id.
18 946 F.2d at 403.
19 742 F. Supp. 392, 394 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 446 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
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welfare plan discrimination between or among categories of
diseases.2 °
On February 25, 1993, the Eleventh Circuit handed down a
similar decision in Owens v. Storehouse, Inc.21 In Owens, the em-
ployer, Storehouse Inc., had modified its employee welfare benefit
plan to provide a lifetime benefits cap of $25,000 for AIDS-related
claims. 22 The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia rejected the allegations of an employee, Owens,
that Storehouse had thereby violated section 510 of ERISA.23 The
court subsequently granted Storehouse's motion for summary
judgment.24 The Eleventh Circuit affimed, holding that "ERISA
does not prohibit a company from terminating previously offered
benefits that are neither vested nor accrued."25
Storehouse instituted its employee welfare benefit plan in
1988, providing for a lifetime maximum benefit of one million dol-
lars per employee.26 In November 1988, Owens was diagnosed
with AIDS and filed an initial claim.2 7 Storehouse's insurer noti-
fied Storehouse of its intent to cancel the policy because of "the
20 946 F.2d at 408 ("Section 510 does not mandate that if some, or most, or virtu-
ally all catastrophic illnesses are covered, AIDS (or any other particular catastrophic
illness) must be among them.").
21 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993).
22 Id. at 396. The terms of Storehouse's original insurance policy provided group
hospital and medical benefits up to a lifetime maximum of one million dollars per
employee. Id. A dispute arose between Storehouse and its insurer when the insurer
refused to continue to insure Storehouse's employees at this rate due to the high inci-
dence of AIDS cases among Storehouse's employees. Id. Thereafter, a new insurance
carrier was sought and an agreement was arranged. Id.
23 773 F. Supp. 416, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that "§ 510 was designed to protect the employment relationship, not the
integrity of specific planse).
24 Id. at 420.
25 984 F.2d at 397 (citing Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987)). The court further stated, "Congress did not
require employee welfare benefit plans to be chiseled in stone. It intended flexibility
in the apportionment of their terms." Id. at 400 (citing Moore v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)). The court continued by noting that § 510
"does not prohibit an employer from crafting its medical plan to meet economic imper-
atives" and does not "mandate fixed coverage of catastrophic diseases." Id. (citing
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983); McGann v. H & H Music Co.,
946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); Hlinka v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1988); Viggiano v. Shenango China Div. of
Anchor Hocking Corp., 750 F.2d 276,279 (3d Cir. 1984); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co.
Retirement Program for Salaried Employees, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985)).
26 984 F.2d at 396.
27 Id. at 396-97.
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high incidence of AIDS in the retail industry generally and among
Storehouse's plan members in particular."28 At that time, five
Storehouse employees had been diagnosed with AIDS.29 Subse-
quently, a series of negotiations were held between Storehouse
and its insurer which led to a new, more costly policy with less
coverage and guaranteed for only six months.3 0 Under this policy,
Storehouse was self-insured for the first $75,000 in AIDS-related
claims, compared to $25,000 with respect to all other claims.31
Faced with the possibility that at the end of six months it would
be self-insured for all claims up to one million dollars per em-
ployee, Storehouse negotiated with and obtained insurance from
another carrier. 2 In order to obtain such coverage, Storehouse
modified its benefit plan to include a $25,000 cap for coverage of
AIDS and AIDS-related illnesses. 3 Notably, the original welfare
benefit plan and each of the amended plans reserved to Store-
house the "full, absolute and discretionary right ... to amend,
modify, suspend, withdraw, discontinue or terminate the Plan in
whole or in part at any time for any and all participants of the
Plan."3 4
In analyzing the claims presented in McGann and Owens, the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits both undertook a review of the statu-
tory language and legislative history of ERISA. Both courts cited
to Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,- wherein the Second Cir-
cuit stated that "[w]ith regard to an employer's right to change
medical plans, Congress evidenced its recognition of the need for
flexibility in rejecting the automatic vesting of welfare plans."36
The Moore court further provided that "medical insurance must
take account of inflation, changes in medical practice and technol-
ogy, and increases in the costs of treatment independent of infla-
28 Id. at 396.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 984 F.2d at 396.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 396-97. Storehouse also imposed caps of $25,000 for mental illness and
substance abuse, $2500 for joint dysfunction, $500 for nicotine dependence and
$10,000 for growth hormone drugs for dependent children. Id. at 397.
34 Id. at 397.
35 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).
36 Id. at 492.
1994] 463
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion."37 Further, the Supreme Court has held that ERISA does
not proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee bene-
fits. 38 As succinctly stated by the Fifth Circuit in McGann, to in-
terpret ERISA section 510 "discrimination" so broadly as to pre-
clude employers from placing a lifetime cap on a particular type of
coverage "would clearly conflict with Congress's intent that em-
ployers remain free to create, modify and terminate the terms and
conditions of employee benefit plans without governmental inter-
ference."39 The McGann court also noted that an employer's right
to change medical plans could lead to "decreas[ing] protection for
future employees and retirees"40 and could ultimately force em-
ployers to cease offering welfare benefits coverage altogether.4 1
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT
Neither the McGann court nor the Owens court were
presented with or discussed the implications of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 even though the Act was being de-
bated at the time and became effective in July 1992.43 Emerging
use of the ADA, however, has signaled a shift in the legal tactics of
AIDS-inflicted employee plaintiffs in their battle to secure health
benefits from their employers.44 Equal rights lawyers and gay
rights activists contend that AIDS is clearly covered under the
ADA definition of a "disability" which is described as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
37 Id. In commenting on the statutory mandate of ERISA, the Owens court also
cited Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985) (stating
that ERISA "does not regulate the substantive content of welfare-benefit plans").
38 See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1985) ("ERISA does not
mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself proscribe
discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.").
39 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
40 Id. (quoting Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir.
1988)). The McGann court further indicated its support for allowing an employer to
change medical plans by noting that "unstable variables" such as "inflation, changes
in medical practice and technology, and increases in the cost of treatment independ-
ent of inflation... prevent accurate predictions of future needs and costs." Id. (quot-
ing Moore, 856 F.2d at 492).
41 Id.
42 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
1993).
43 Id.
44See Barbara Presley Noble, Clashing Over AIDS Coverage, N.Y. TjMEs, Oct. 10,
1993, at F23 (discussing success of EEOC's Los Angeles office in quickly settling case
in which they claimed ADA's protection extended to cases of two men suffering from
AIDS whose coverage under insurance carrier dropped from $300,000 to $5000).
464 [Vol. 68:459
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major life activities of such individual."45 Of the over 14,000
AIDS-related ADA disability complaints that have been filed at
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), sev-
eral dozen are benefits-related.4 6
The ADA does not deal, on its face, with particular benefit
plan limitations based on specific disabilities, and the EEOC has
not formally dealt with the issue. The agency has, however, is-
sued an informal "EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA
to Health Insurance" ("EEOC Guidance"),4 7 pursuant to which a
number of test cases have been initiated.48
The EEOC Guidance states that "not all health-related plan
distinctions discriminate on the basis of disability."49 It further
explains that providing "a lower level of benefits.., for the treat-
ment of mental/nervous conditions than is provided for the treat-
ment of physical conditions" or providing for less or no benefits for
eye care than for other physical conditions are "broad distinctions"
which apply to the treatment of a "multitude of dissimilar condi-
tions" and are not distinctions based on disability."0 The EEOC
further provides that although such distinctions may have a
greater impact on certain individuals with disabilities, they do not
intentionally discriminate on the basis of disability and do not vio-
late the ADA. 5 1 However, the EEOC Guidance also states:
In contrast, however, health-related insurance distinctions
that are based on disability may violate the ADA. A term or pro-
vision is "disability-based" if it singles out a particular disability
(e.g., deafness, AIDS, schizophrenia), a discrete group of disabili-
ties (e.g., cancers, muscular dystrophies, kidney diseases), or dis-
45 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
46 See Noble, supra note 44, at F23.
47 EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health Insurance, 3 EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 176, at N:2301 (June 8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
48 See David A. Copus, Americans With Disabilities Act, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 11, 1993,
at S12.
49 EEOC Guidance, supra note 47, at N:2303. The EEOC Guidance indicates that
"[ilnsurance distinctions that are not based on disability, and that are applied equally
to all insured employees, do not discriminate on the basis of disability...." Id. More
specifically, "broad distinctions, which apply to the treatment of a multitude of dis-
similar conditions and which constrain individuals both with and without disabilities,
are not distinctions based on disability." Id.
50 EEOC Guidance, supra note 47.
51 EEOC Guidance, supra note 47.
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ability in general (e.g., non-coverage of all conditions that sub-
stantially limit a major life activity).52
The EEOC appears willing to permit employers to limit
health insurance benefits for treatment of some, but not all, classi-
fications of disorders. The remaining classifications are consid-
ered disability-based distinctions and, therefore, improper unless
within the protective ambit of section 501(c). It is submitted that
such distinctions seem artificial and arbitrary, and that upon close
analysis the EEOC Guidance does not provide the guidance
promised.
Section 501(c) of the ADA specifically states that the Act
should not be construed to prohibit or restrict a health care pro-
vider or administrator from underwriting, classifying, or adminis-
tering risks, or from establishing or observing terms of a "bona
fide" benefit plan that is not subject to state insurance regula-
tion.53 This section also states, however, that the employer may
not use this right as a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the
Act.54
The question, then, is how to reconcile the language of section
501 and the general purpose of the ADA with ERISA, which un-
questionably occupies the field, to prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of disability.
The terms "bona fide" and "subterfuge" have been fleshed out,
defined, and explained in other federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes55 and in Supreme Court decisions such as United Air
Lines, Inc. v. McMann56 in 1977 and Public Employees Retirement
System v. Betts5 7 in 1989. The Supreme Court held in McMann
that a benefit plan is "bona fide" if it "exists and pays benefits."58
The Betts Court held that "subterfuge" occurs only when the em-
ployer has an actual intent to circumvent the ADA in an aspect of
52 Id. at N:2304. Conversely, some commentators argue that persons with the
HIV virus or AIDS may not be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Such a posi-
tion would severely undercut the EEOC's "informal" position that all persons who are
HIV positive or have AIDS constitute a discrete group.
53 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1993).
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1993).
56 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
57 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
58 434 U.S. at 194. Justice White, in his concurring opinion, stated that United's
plan was found to be "bona fide" because it provided "substantial benefits." Id. at 206-
07.
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employment unrelated to fringe benefits.59 The clear congres-
sional intent in ERISA and the Supreme Court's construction of
the terms in related employment cases, which was not rejected by
Congress in enacting the ADA, should control.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF T=E ADA
Much of the legislative history of the ADA indicates that the
statute was not intended to affect the regulation of the insurance
industry. During the debates over the ADA, the United States
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated that
"section 501(c) . .. should not be interpreted as subjecting self-
insured plans to any State insurance laws of general application
regarding underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering
such risks that are otherwise preempted by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."60 Similarly, the
House Judiciary Committee stated that section 501(c) was not in-
tended to affect the legitimate classification of risks in insurance
plans, and that benefits should continue to be underwritten for
health insurance to limit or exclude coverage "so long as the stan-
dards used are based on sound actuarial data and not on specula-
tion."61 The Committee further stated that "[s]ection 501(c)(2)
recognizes the need for employers, and their [insurers], to estab-
lish and observe the terms of employee benefit plans, so long as
these plans are based on legitimate underwriting or classification
of risks."62
The House Committee on Education and Labor, referring to
section 501, stated that the primary purposes of the ADA "include
prohibiting discrimination in employment, public services, and
places of public accommodation," but that the committee "does not
intend that any provisions of this legislation should affect the way
the insurance industry does business in accordance with the State
laws and regulations under which it is regulated."6 The commit-
tee report further stated that "a person with a disability cannot be
59 492 U.S. at 177. The court, in construing the statutory language, adopted the
ordinary meaning of "subterfuge" and defined it as a "scheme, plan, stratagem, or
artifice of evasion." Id. at 167.
60 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1989).
61 H.R. REP. No. 485 (HI), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 493.
62 Id.
63 H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419.
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denied insurance or be subject to different terms or conditions of
insurance based on disability alone," but that costs and increased
insurance risks must be taken into account. 4 Additionally, the
committee report indicated that section 501(c) was added to make
it clear that the new legislation would not "disrupt the current
nature of insurance underwriting or the current regulatory struc-
ture for self-insured employers or of the insurance industry in
sales, underwriting, pricing, administrative and other services,
claims, and similar insurance related activities based on classifi-
cation of risks .... 65
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Re-
port also stated that, under the ADA, "it is permissible for an em-
ployer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain
procedures or treatments," and that "[a] limitation may be placed
on reimbursements for a procedure or the types of drugs or proce-
dures covered... [provided that] [aJll people with disabilities have
equal access to the health insurance coverage that is provided by
the employer to all employees."66 Moreover, the report continued:
"Employers may continue to offer policies that contain pre-
existing condition exclusions, even though such exclusions ad-
versely affect people with disabilities, so long as such clauses are
not used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
legislation." 7
IV. THE EEOC POSITION
The EEOC appears to disagree with both the legislative his-
tory and the express language of the statute. It has completely
rejected the Supreme Court's interpretation of the terms "bona
fide" and "subterfuge" and, instead, proposes in its EEOC Gui-
dance a nonexclusive list of potential business or insurance justifi-
cations that a respondent must prove when any disability-based
limitation it imposes is challenged.68
64 Id. The Committee Report states that the ADA prohibits an insurer from deny-
ing insurance or raising the rates of a disabled person without their decision being
based on a risk calculation. Id.
65 Id.
66 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1989).
67 Id. at 29.
68 EEOC Guidance, supra note 47, at N:2306-07.
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The EEOC's position has led to increased benefits-related liti-
gation throughout the country.69 In April 1993, the Los Angeles
regional office of the EEOC filed suit against the Allied Services
Division Welfare Fund for reducing AIDS-related coverage from
$300,000 to $5000.70 The case was settled in late September with
the Fund agreeing to pay damages of $10,500 to two men, presum-
ably to avoid the potential cost of litigation.71
Then, in June 1993, the EEOC filed suit in New York federal
court against the Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund,72
claiming that a cap on benefits for treatment of HIV, AIDS Re-
lated Complex ("ARC"), and AIDS-related illnesses violated the
ADA.7 3 The Fund had eliminated medical coverage for these ill-
nesses over a year before the effective date of the ADA.7 4 The
Fund moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that only ERISA, and
not the ADA, governs medical plan modifications since ERISA
"fully occupies" the field of employee benefit plans.7, 5 They further
69 See Copus, supra note 48, at S12. Copus notes that since the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, more individuals have turned to lawsuits to chal-
lenge "disability-specific benefit plan limitations." Id.; see also Noble, supra note 44, at
F23. For example, on September 14, 1993, "John Doe" filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, challenging his employer's
benefit cap on treatment of AIDS related conditions. Id.
70 Id.
71 Noble, supra note 44, at F23. The author also notes that many benefits-related
complaints have been filed by the EEOC under the guise of a violation of the ADA. Id.
72 EEOC v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, No. 93-3865 (S.D.N.Y.
filed June 9, 1993).
73 Copus, supra note 48, at S12; see N.Y. Benefit Fund Asks Court to Invalidate
EEOC Ruling on AIDS Discrimination Under ADA, 40 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-8
(Mar. 3, 1993) [hereinafter N.Y. Benefit Fund].
74 See N.Y. Benefit Fund, supra note 73, at A8. (I"e Mason Tender's strongest
argument is the jurisdictional argument-that the fund predates the effective date of
the ADA and that when it cut back benefits ... it was... making a 'good business
judgment.'").
75 EEOC v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, No. 93-3865 (S.D.N.Y.
filed June 9, 1993). ERISA's regulatory scope is grounded in a broad preemption
clause. Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts "any and all state laws insofar as they now
or hereafter relate to any benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1993). "A law 'relates to'
an employee benefit plan ... if it has a connection with or reference to such plan."
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
In Mason Tenders, the Fund also argued that it was not an "employer" or "agent"
of an "employer" under ERISA and thus not subject to liability under the ADA. EEOC
v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, No. 93-3865 (S.D.N.Y. fied June 9,
1993). Such an argument, that a fund is not a covered entity under the ADA, was
accepted by a New Hampshire federal judge in Carparts Distribution Ctr. Inc. v. Auto-
motive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England Inc. Ins. Plan, 826 F. Supp. 583, 585
(D.N.H. 1993) vacated, No. 93-1954, 1994 WL 543530 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994). Judge
Sprizzo, however, rejected this argument in his decision.
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asserted that Congress enacted ERISA to create incentives for the
establishment and continuance of health and other employee ben-
efit plans, and that the ADA is not, and should not be, construed
as a "mandated benefit statute."7 6 The Fund acknowledged that
even if the EEOC view is accepted, employers and insurers may
still impose disability-based distinctions under the ADA provided
they can satisfy their burden of proof by producing an adequate
business or cost justification for the plan limitation.
On November 19, 1993, Judge John E. Sprizzo denied the
Fund's motion to dismiss, reserving for trial proof of the Fund's
business necessity, or as the court stated, an actuarial basis for
the exclusion.77 Judge Sprizzo's decision appears to have adopted
the position enunciated in the EEOC Guidance.78
Finally, on September 9, 1993, the Philadelphia district office
of the EEOC charged the Laborers District Council Building and
Construction Health and Welfare Fund (which insures Philadel-
phia construction workers) with violations of the ADA in capping
lifetime medical benefits for AIDS-related illnesses at $10,000. 79
Plan participants were otherwise eligible for lifetime benefits of
up to $100,000 for any disease or condition unrelated to HIV infec-
tion. The Fund contended that the cap was necessary because of
its "precarious financial state, caused by a decline in hours worked
by union members and rising health care costs."8 0 The Fund also
argued that the lifestyle of its members, who have a greater than
average drug history, places them at greater risk for HIV infec-
tion.81 The EEOC, finding that the Fund had no real data to sub-
76 EEOC v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, No. 93-3865 (S.D.N.Y.
filed June 9, 1993).
77 See Mason Tenders v. Donaghey, 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Federal Court
Denies Summary Judgment to Fund That Cut Off Coverage of Aids, 223 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Nov. 22, 1993).
78 See Karen Donovan, Health Fund Held Subject to ADA In AIDS Exemption,
NATL L.J., Dec. 6, 1993 at 17, 22. Specifically, the author describes the EEOC's defi-
nition of "subterfuge" as being "disability based disparate treatment that is not justi-
fied by the risks or costs associated with the disability." Id. at 22.
79 See Laborers Dist. Council Bldg. & Constr. Health & Welfare Fund, EEOC
Charge No. 170930899 (Sept. 9, 1993); see also EEOC Finds Union Health Fund Vio-
lated ADA by Capping HIV-Related Benefits at $10,000, 186 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at
D9 (Sept. 28, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Violation]. The EEOC determined that the
cap was a "subterfuge" because it occurred just two months after the insured was
diagnosed with AIDS. Id.
80 See EEOC Violation, supra note 79, at D9; see also N.Y. Benefit Fund, supra
note 73, at A8.
81 See EEOC Violation, supra note 79, at D9.
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stantiate these claims, announced that it would be prepared to go
to federal court to seek a preliminary injunction lifting the cap if
settlement efforts fail. 2
CONCLUSION
Companies and insurance plans assert that eliminating or
capping coverage for AIDS is not inherently discriminatory, but is
essential for employers and plans that endeavor to be fiscally re-
sponsible. They note that the basic objective of insurance is to
provide the greatest coverage for the least cost despite the fact
that some diseases are more expensive than others. It appears to
some that the EEOC is trying to impose social policy on fiduciary
decisions governed exclusively by ERISA. By providing "gui-
dance" in the absence of express statutory authority in the ADA or
clear legislative history, the EEOC may be overstepping legiti-
mate administrative boundaries.
While the courts seek to resolve the conflict between ERISA
and the ADA, as exemplified by McGann, Owens, and the recently
initiated EEOC litigation, President Clinton's proposed health
care reform may moot some, if not all, of the dispute. The Clinton
plan guarantees uniform coverage for virtually all medical condi-
tions, including AIDS.83 However, enactment of health care re-
form may be several years away, thereby leaving a window of op-
portunity for significant litigation. In addition, the Clinton
proposal does not cover long-term disability plans. Thus, to the
extent employer long-term disability plans exclude disabilities
arising from AIDS-related illnesses, protracted litigation may con-
tinue . 4  Finally, an analysis of the Clinton plan reveals a pro-
posed dollar cap on treatment for mental and nervous disorders
and substance abuse.8 5 Whether these proposed caps, if adopted,
lend credence to employers' claims that disability-specific caps do
not violate the ADA is a question for future debate.
Employee benefits now exceed thirty percent of an employer's
labor costs. Health care costs account for the overwhelming ma-
jority of these costs, and, unless retarded by health care reform,
are expected to double over the next two years and, thereafter, to
82 186 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D9 (Sept. 28, 1993).
83 For a discussion of the Clinton proposal, see generally Robert Pear, Congress Is
Given Clinton Proposal for Health Care, N.Y. Toms, Oct. 28, 1993, at Al.
84 Copus, supra note 48, at S12.
85 Copus, supra note 48, at S12.
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continue to rise at an average rate ranging from ten to thirteen
percent. Insurers across the country are filing for and lobbying for
substantial increases in benefit plan premiums. If these increases
are granted, it is estimated that the annual cost for a family of
four, with basic coverage, would increase to almost $10,000 per
year in most major cities. As President Clinton observed, the
United States is "choking on a health care system that is not
working."8 6
AIDS-related conditions account for an increasingly signifi-
cant portion of health care costs every year. In the coming years,
other diseases may be discovered that give rise to costs equal to or
exceeding those now being incurred in connection with HIV and
AIDS-related conditions. Efforts by the EEOC to advance the
cause of social justice and protect the financial well-being of the
small but increasing number of employees may, in reality, lead to
the unintended result of forcing employers and insurers to impose
annual and lifetime dollar caps across-the-board for all plan par-
ticipants, or to eliminate coverage altogether. In this regard, the
EEOC seems to be at cross purposes with the White House and
Congress.
86 Pear, supra, note 83, at Al.
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